Criminal Record Of "Charden/Chardin Marlowe Gomez" (Relationship To Malo Gomez Unknown)

Photo from the public Facebook profile of "Malo Locco Gomez," used under First Amendment comment and criticism, blog post by John Hoff

The relationship between "bored shooter" Malo D. Gomez and a man called "Charden Marlowe Gomez" is unknown. An interesting comment was posted to this blog that caused me to dig into the criminal record of Charden M. Gomez, born in 1961. Other records spell the name "Chardin" but it appears to be the same individual, kind of like Rayjon Gomez is also Ray'Jon Gomez, and Dashaunta Gomez is also Shaunta Gomez, and Malo Dashaunta Gomez is Malo Locco Gomez on Facebook.

One thing that is certain: Malo comes from a pretty messed up family, when you consider the incarceration of his relative Dashaunta Gomez (who is most likely Malo's brother) and the death of 13-year-old Rayjon Gomez (believed to be a brother or a cousin and, as revealed exclusively on this blog, he was hanging out with the Sticc Up Boys)

So it wouldn't be a bit surprising if...

...Malo "Bored Shooter" Gomez was related to Charden Gomez. Then again, he may not be, but it is still socially useful to gather up Charden's criminal record and make it easily accessible on the internet, as follows:

27-CR-79-902476 GOMEZ, CHARDEN MARLOWE
01/02/1961 12/10/1979
Hennepin Criminal/Traffic/Petty Downtown Crim/Traf Mandatory
Closed BURGLARY

27-CR-81-900240 GOMEZ, CHARDEN MARLOWE
01/02/1961 01/23/1981
Hennepin Criminal/Traffic/Petty Downtown Crim/Traf Mandatory
Closed BURGLARY
SIMPLE ROBBERY

27-CR-81-900579 GOMEZ, CHARDEN MARLOWE
01/02/1961 03/10/1981
Hennepin Criminal/Traffic/Petty Downtown Crim/Traf Mandatory
Closed AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
SIMPLE ROBBERY
BURGLARY

27-CR-86-900065 GOMEZ, CHARDEN MARLOWE
01/02/1961 01/07/1986
Hennepin Criminal/Traffic/Petty Downtown Crim/Traf Mandatory
Closed THEFT FROM PERSON

27-CR-89-028143 GOMEZ, CHARDEN MARLOWE
01/02/1961 06/23/1989
Hennepin Criminal/Traffic/Petty Downtown Crim/Traf Mandatory
Closed UNAUTHORIZED USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE
THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLE

27-CR-89-043149 GOMEZ, CHARDEN MARLOWE
01/02/1961 08/15/1989
Hennepin Criminal/Traffic/Petty Downtown Crim/Traf Mandatory
Closed 1ST DEGREE BURGLARY
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY

27-CR-89-043933 GOMEZ, CHARDEN MARLOWE
01/02/1961 08/16/1989
Hennepin Criminal/Traffic/Petty Downtown Crim/Traf Mandatory
Closed 1ST DEGREE BURGLARY
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY
FIN TRANS CARD FRAUD (UNAUTH USE)

27-CR-89-044038 GOMEZ, CHARDEN MARLOWE
01/02/1961 10/20/1989
Hennepin Criminal/Traffic/Petty Downtown Crim/Traf Mandatory
Closed 1ST DEGREE BURGLARY
1ST DEGREE BURGLARY
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY-BODILY HARM

27-CR-89-061552 GOMEZ, CHARDEN MARLOWE
01/02/1961 10/23/1989
Hennepin Criminal/Traffic/Petty Downtown Crim/Traf Mandatory
Closed 1ST DEGREE BURGLARY
1ST DEGREE BURGLARY
66-K2-00-001718 GOMEZ, CHARDIN MARLOW
01/02/1961 12/04/2000
Rice Felony
Converted Closed CONSP TO COMMIT INTR CONT

27-CR-01-031426 GOMEZ, CHARDEN MARLOWE
01/02/1961 04/24/2001
Hennepin Criminal/Traffic/Petty Downtown Crim/Traf Mandatory
Closed 1ST DEG MURDER - PREMEDITATED
2ND DEG MURDER W/BURGLARY - DANGEROUS WEAPON
2ND DEG MURDER W/AGG ROBBERY - BODILY HARM
2ND DEG MURDER W/AGG ROBBERY - BODILY HARM
2ND DEG MURDER W/AGG ROBBERY - DANGEROUS WEAPON
2ND DEG MURDER W/AGG ROBBERY - DANGEROUS WEAPON
1ST DEG MURDER - PREMEDITATED
2ND DEG MURDER W/INTENT W/OUT PREMEDITATION
2ND DEG MURDER W/INTENT W/OUT PREMEDITATION
1ST DEG MURDER-WHILE COMMITTING BURGLARY IN DWELLING
1ST DEG MURDER WHILE COMMITTING BURGLARY IN A DWELLING
2ND DEG MURDER WITH ASSAULT
2ND DEG MURDER WITH ASSAULT
2ND DEG MURDER W/BURGLARY - DANGEROUS WEAPON

Charden did file an appeal in regard to being convicted of murder. I was only able to find a small summary of the appeal and not the appeal itself:

Wednesday, September 8, 2004, 9:00 a.m., Supreme Court Courtroom, State Capitol

State of Minnesota, Respondent vs. Chardin Gomez, Appellant – Case No. A03-1075:

In an appeal from his conviction of two counts of first-degree murder during the commission of a burglary, appellant raises the following issues:

(1) whether appellant was denied his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury of his peers when the trial court denied Batson challenges to the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges against non‑Caucasian jurors;

(2) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the admission of evidence of prior bad acts by the appellant; and

(3) whether the trial court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury on appellant’s right not to testify without obtaining appellant’s consent to give the instruction. (On appeal from Hennepin County District Court.)

Charden (note name spelled differently) also joined this appeal, which was an unsuccessful attempt to keep blood and semen evidence out of the trial.

STATE v. NMN KROMAH

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Eric NMN KROMAH, et al., Respondents, Charden Marlowe Gomez, Respondent.

No. C8-02-1034.

-- February 24, 2003
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

Michael A. Hatch, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, Patrick C. Diamond, Sr. Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, Stephen L. Redding, Sr. Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.Leonardo Castro, Chief Fourth District Public Defender, Patrick Sullivan, David Murrin, Assistant Hennepin County Public Defenders, Minneapolis, MN, Caroline Durham, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents.

OPINION

The state appeals a pretrial district court decision suppressing DNA evidence in eight separately charged cases involving different defendants and offenses.1  For ease of reference, these eight defendants will be referred to as the “Kromah, et al., defendants.”   The court concluded that the DNA testing methodology, known as PCR-STR, and the kits that utilized the PCR-STR methodology were “generally accepted in the scientific community and that the BCA [Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension] lab's matches have foundational reliability” as required under the Frye-Mack test.2  Nonetheless, relying on the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in State v. Traylor, 641 N.W.2d 335 (Minn.App.2002), the district court concluded that the DNA evidence was inadmissible because the BCA did not comply with the Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Method (TWGDAM) guidelines.   The state contends that the district court's conclusion was in error and that the DNA Advisory Board (DAB) standards complied with by the BCA have superseded the TWGDAM guidelines.   We reverse, and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with our holding in State v. Traylor, No. C6-01-244, 656 N.W.2d 885 (Minn.2003).

The Kromah, et al., defendants have been charged with an array of crimes including murder, criminal sexual conduct, kidnapping, and assault.   In each case, blood or semen samples were taken and the DNA analysis performed by the BCA allegedly connected each defendant to a victim or a crime scene.   It is this evidence that the state intended to introduce at trial that is the subject of this appeal.

Based on the court of appeals decision in Traylor, each of the Kromah, et al., defendants brought a pretrial motion to suppress the DNA evidence.   The eight cases were joined for the purpose of conducting a combined Frye-Mack pretrial hearing.   Because the grounds for the defendants' motions to suppress involved all the issues raised in Traylor, the court granted the state's motion to supplement the record with the exhibits and transcripts from the Traylor hearing.

At the conclusion of the Frye-Mack hearing, the district court granted the defendants' motion to suppress the DNA evidence.   The court based its ruling on the court of appeals holding in Traylor that the TWGDAM guidelines must be followed.3  Because the district court determined that the TWGDAM guidelines required the primer sequences to be known to the scientific community at large and because the primer sequences were not known, the court concluded that the BCA's testing procedures were not in compliance with the TWGDAM guidelines.   It is from this decision that the state petitioned our court for accelerated review in an effort to join the Kromah, et al., cases with the Traylor case.   We granted the state's petition but did not consolidate the Traylor and Kromah, et al., cases.   Instead, we heard and considered the cases contemporaneously.

The threshold issue that we must address in a pretrial appeal is whether the state has demonstrated that the suppression of the DNA evidence will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial.  State v. Webber, 262 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn.1977).  “Critical impact is met when the suppression of the evidence significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.”  In re Welfare of L.E.P., 594 N.W.2d 163, 168 (Minn.1999) (citing State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 551 (Minn.1987)).   The Kromah, et al., defendants contend that the state has not made a showing of critical impact, and therefore, review by this court is improper.

Review of the record reveals that the facts are not sufficiently developed for us to conclude that the suppression of the DNA evidence significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution in each of these cases. Nonetheless, the issue in each of these cases-the suppression of DNA testing using the PCR-STR methodology-is identical to the issue in State v. Traylor, 641 N.W.2d 335, 341 (Minn.App.2002), rev. granted (Minn. May 14, 2002).   Important to our consideration to grant the petition for accelerated review in the first instance was our expectation that the record in the joined cases, which was developed two years after the record in Traylor, would provide a more complete and updated record for our review in deciding the complex issues surrounding DNA testing.   For this reason and in the interest of judicial economy, we exercise our inherent authority to review these eight cases in this particular and unique situation.

We turn to the next issue of whether the district court erred in suppressing the DNA evidence in these eight cases.   Treating the court of appeals decision in Traylor as stare decisis, the district court examined the BCA's compliance with the TWGDAM guidelines and ruled that the TWGDAM guidelines were not met.   Because compliance with the TWGDAM guidelines is not mandated, we reverse and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings to determine if the BCA has complied with the appropriate standards and procedures for DNA testing.   See State v. Traylor, No. C6-01-244, 656 N.W.2d 885 (Minn.2003)

Finally, in addition to contesting the admissibility of the DNA evidence, the Kromah, et al., defendants contest the district court's findings regarding the presentation of the DNA statistical evidence.   The state contends the defendants waived this issue because they did not cross-appeal the district court's ruling on the presentation of statistical evidence or cross-petition when the state filed its petition for accelerated review.   We agree with the state and decline to address the issue at this stage in the proceeding.

Nonetheless, we encourage district courts to be mindful of the impact of quantitative probability statistics on DNA analysis.   In State v. Joon Kyu Kim, we disallowed the admission of quantitative statistical probability evidence, recognizing the danger that a jury may equate such evidence with the likelihood that the defendant was guilty.  398 N.W.2d 544, 548-49 (Minn.1987).   Although in State v. Bloom we provided a DNA exception to the Kim rule that quantitative statistical probability evidence is inadmissible, we did so without overturning Kim. 516 N.W.2d 159, 167-68 (Minn.1994).   Thus, courts need to be fully cognizant of the potentially prejudicial nature of the statistical probability evidence and ensure that DNA identification evidence is not presented in a misleading or unfairly prejudicial way.4  Bloom, 516 N.W.2d at 168-69.

Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.  The following eight cases have been joined for purposes of this appeal:  State v. Kromah, No. 01092843 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. June 19, 2002);  State v. Gomez, No. 01031426 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. June 19, 2002);  State v. Wilson, No. 02007849 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. June 19, 2002);  State v. Newman, No. 02020774 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. June 19, 2002);  State v. Szutz, No. 01104493 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. June 19, 2002);  State v. Johnson, No. 01080426 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. June 19, 2002);  State v. Gurneau, No. 02013492 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. June 19, 2002);  and State v. Dahlin, No. 01004420 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct. June 19, 2002).

2.  In Minnesota a two-pronged standard, known as Frye-Mack, must be satisfied before DNA evidence may be admitted.   The first prong of the Frye-Mack standard, general acceptance in the relevant scientific community, looks at whether experts in the field widely share the view that the results of scientific testing are scientifically reliable.  State v. Roman Nose, 649 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn.2002).   The second prong, foundational reliability, examines whether the laboratory conducting the tests in the individual case complied with appropriate standards and controls.  Id.

3.  Though the district court noted that it was not bound by the court of appeals decision in Traylor because we had granted review, the district court nonetheless considered the decision as stare decisis.

4.  The potentially prejudicial or misleading nature of DNA evidence is of increasing concern with the current DNA identification techniques.   Because of the number of loci that can now be tested, the traditional probability statistical methods yield statistics such as one out of the world's population or one in 800 billion.   See State v. Thoms, No. C0-01-1373, 2002 WL 1420724 at *1 (Minn.App. July 2, 2002), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2002);  Whitfield v. State, 346 Ark. 43, 56 S.W.3d 357, 358 (2001).   With numbers of this magnitude, district courts should be mindful of the potential impact such numbers may have on jurors and take steps to ensure that the presentation of the statistical evidence is not unfairly prejudicial or misleading.

BLATZ, Chief Justice.

HANSON, J., took no part.